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RICHARD K. CALL vs. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
ON THE SEMINOLE WAR
by HERBERT J. DOHERTY, JR.
In the city of Washington in the autumn of 1836, the United
States War Department was in a state of high confusion. On
the sixth of October Lewis Cass had resigned as Secretary
of War and the vacancy was temporarily filled by an under
secretary, C. A. Harris. Within a few days the office was be-
stowed upon Benjamin F. ButIer, an interim appointee. These
changes came during one of the crises of the Seminole War
in Florida, which added to the confusion in Washington, In
midsummer the command of that war had been vested in
Governor Richard K. Call who launched an end-the-war cam-
paign in early October. This initial move was not successful
and rumors of its failure kept official circles in Washington
in a state of nervous tension.
By the first of November, Washington had learned of the
circumstances of Call’s withdrawal through second-hand sources,
yet no report from Governor Call had been received. President
Andrew Jackson expressed surprise and disappointment at news
of the retrograde movements of Governor Call, and directed
Secretary of War Butler to relieve Call of the command of
the campaign. 1 Accordingly, on November 4, 1836, Butler wrote
a lengthy letter to Call relieving him of his command and
explaining the confusion in Washington. He related that no
official reports had been received and urged that Call explain
fully without delay. In the absence of any report, Butler said,
the public interest demanded that the government take what
action it thought necessary. He related that reliable reports
1. B. F. Butler to R. K. Call, November 4, 1836, Senate Documents, 26
Congress, 1 Session, No. 278. Unless otherwise noted, all information
in this article comes from the Senate Document here cited. This docu-
ment is a 250-page compilation of all War Department correspondence
relating to Call’s conduct of the Seminole War in 1836.
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stated that Call was suffering from illness and fatigue, conse-
quently, the president had found it expedient to place Major
General Thomas S. Jesup in command,
Jackson’s order, sent through Butler, did not reach Call for
several weeks. Meanwhile, after his initial failure of October
13, and before the orders relieving him were delivered, Call
reorganized his forces and met the Indians in battle on No-
vember 17, 18, and 21. In each encounter the Indians were
driven from the field, but their losses were relatively small.
All three engagements took place east of the Withlacoochee
River, in the area north of Dade’s battleground. After the last
battle, Call withdrew to his supply base at Volusia on the
St. Johns River. It was there that he received the news of
his removal.
After a lapse of several weeks time, Call replied to Butler
in a bitter letter which was an index of his disappointment
and chagrin at being removed from a post which he had so
ardently desired. His bitterness toward the president was evi-
dent as he wrote, “I have been visited with the greatest in-
justice by the orders of the President.” The nature of the
injustice which he believed had been inflicted upon him was
seen in his criticism of the president for removing him “on
rumor, without waiting for my official report.” He declared
that his intent was to resign the governorship as soon as Jack-
son should grant him an investigation of the conduct of the
war - a step which Jackson declined to take.
I I
The dismissal of Richard K. Call from command of the
Seminole War was an important point in the personal rela-
tions of Call and Jackson. Call had been an early protege of
the old general, had served under him in the War of 1812
and in the Florida invasions, and had received important
positions due to the esteem in which he was held by Jackson.
2
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Their relations were of a most cordial and close nature during
their military and brief Congressional careers. However, when
Jackson became president in 1828 the two men began to drift
apart. Their first major differences were over cabinet appoint-
ments. Call vigorously objected to the appointment of John
H. Eaton as Secretary of War and John M. Berrien as Attorney-
General. Jackson was offended, particularly by Call’s opposi-
tion to Eaton, and both men served despite Call’s objections.
Call played no major role in Florida during the Jackson
administrations but devoted the years from 1828 to 1836 to
private business for the most part, enhancing his personal
fortune considerably. He had held the post of Brigadier Gen-
eral of the Florida Militia since 1823 and in this capacity he
was concerned over the rising difficulties with the Seminole
Indians. The federal government by 1830 had determined upon
a policy of Indian removal to an area west of the Mississippi
River. By 1834, treaties had been concluded with the Sem-
inoles for their removal, and Indian agent Wiley Thompson   
and General Duncan Clinch had arrived to supervise the re-
moval Under the influence of fiery young warriors, however,
the Indians became sullen and uncooperative and not until
April of 1835 did Thompson secure their half-hearted assent
to removal plans.
Plans were drawn up for the departure of the Indians from
Tampa Bay in January, 1836, but all were forgotten when on
December 28, 1835, Wiley Thompson was murdered near Fort
King and Major Francis L. Dade and his troops were mas-
sacred in Big Wahoo Swamp. Three days later the first pitched
battle of the Seminole War was fought at the Withlacoochee
River. In this battle Call commanded a group of mounted
volunteers and General Clinch commanded the regulars. Clinch
ferried his men across the river while Call and his volunteers
proceeded on the north and west side. Clinch soon engaged
3
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his troops with the warriors of Osceola and a bitter battle
was waged. Call’s volunteers, probably about four hundred
men, watched the battle from across the stream despite the
fact that Call and several of his officers crossed over to the
aid of Clinch. Why the volunteers did not cross has been the
subject of much controversy. Call claims that he was unable
to force the men over. The official excuse was that the stream
was too fast and too deep, at the point of battle, for a safe
crossing. The regular army was bitterly critical of Call and
the volunteers, and the newspapers censured Call unmercifully. 2
About a week after the Withlacoochee fiasco of December
31 Call wrote to Jackson that Clinch had only 150 men and
that at least 2500 to 3000 would be necessary to end the war.
He added that he had put at Clinch’s disposal 150 mounted
volunteers. Though Call had disagreed with Jackson on some
of his policies the two men had not yet broken friendly rela-
tions and Call ended this report on the state of affairs with
a plea for command of the war: “I should be highly gratified
to command the army, and believe I could soon bring the
war to a close. I fear, however, this I cannot do without in-
justice to General Clinch; he is a brave and good man, but
I fear he is too slow in his movements to conduct a war
against the Indians.” With this letter, Call began his campaign
to win command of the Seminole War.
Call’s interest in the conduct of the war was diverted in
February when personal tragedy struck him. On the twenty-
eighth of that month his beloved wife, Mary Kirkman, died
after a very brief illness. This loss came as a climax of per-
sonal troubles, for in their twelve years of married life Mary
and Richard Call had lost five children. Andrew Jackson was
sorely touched by each of the deaths in the Call family, par-
2. Sidney W. Martin, “Richard Keith Call,” Florida Historical Quarterly,
XXI (April, 1943), 339-341.
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ticularly that of Mary whom he had regarded almost as a
daughter. He forwarded his condolences to Call, then within
two weeks time affixed his signature to a commission naming
Call to the governorship of Florida. In later years Call claimed
that the appointment was a complete surprise to him, coming
without his knowledge or application. 3
Call accepted the office and requested Jackson to name
Leigh Read of Tallahassee to his former post of Brigadier
General of Militia, which request was granted. Call succeeded
his one-time friend, John H. Eaton, whom he accused of
attempting to keep him out of military activity, and started
immediately a barrage of correspondence to the War Depart-
ment requesting attention to the Seminole War and offering
advice as to its conduct. Almost two months after taking office
he directed an indignant letter to President Jackson informing
him that he had received no answer whatever from the Sec-
retary of War and asking presidential attention to the cor-
respondence. He pictured the Territory as being in dire straits
and said, “I can hear of no measure proposed for our defense,
and I assure you, sir, if something is not promptly done, that
this country will be desolated during the summer.”
In his voluminous correspondence, Call proposed a summer
campaign to be launched as a maximum effort, with the aim
of destroying the homes and crops of the Indians. This was
based upon the theory that offense is the best defense. One
thousand men employed in such a campaign would, he be-
lieved, do more good than ten thousand stretched on a line
across the peninsula for purely defensive purposes. Call’s plan
struck Andrew Jackson very favorably and before his letter
complaining of inattention reached Washington Secretary of
War Cass wrote him that he and Jackson had approved his
plan. They had believed, Cass wrote, that a summer campaign
3. House Executive Documents, 26 Congress, 1 Session, No. 136.
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could not be endured in Florida, but had decided to defer to
Call’s experience and knowledge.
Call immediately replied to Cass, apologizing for his warmth
of expression and outlining at greater length his war strategy.
He added, “I should be gratified by being directed to lead
the expedition against the Seminoles.” To Andrew Jackson he
wrote, “Nothing have I so much desired as to have the direc-
tion of the Florida War,” and he added, “In conducting the
campaign, I shall be governed by the rules pursued by you
with so much success, and with which I am perfectly familiar.”
General Winfield Scott had been placed in command of the
forces in Florida in January, 1836, but by May the Depart-
ment of War had decided to move him to Georgia to direct
operations against the Creeks. Cass wrote to Call that should
Scott leave Florida and General Clinch retire from the service,
then Call was authorized “to assume the command of the
regular forces and the militia serving in Florida, and to employ
them in the best manner for the defence of the country and
the speedy subjugation of the Indians.” Call was further ad-
vised that should General Thomas Jesup move into the Ter-
ritory then the command would automatically devolve upon
that officer.
III
On June 18, 1836, the letter which Call had so long desired
was dispatched by Jackson. It placed command of the regular
army, fifteen hundred Tennessee mounted volunteers, and the
Florida militia in the hands of Governor Richard K. Call.
Joyfully Call wrote to the president, “I accept, with great
pleasure, of the trust you have conferred on me; and I promise
you that I will soon put an end to the war in Florida, or
perish in the attempt.” Cass cautioned Call that everything
rested upon his judgement, for Florida conditions were un-
known in Washington. He urged him to use extreme care in
6
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exposing the troops to the Florida climate and authorized him
to procure all necessary supplies and equipment for the cam-
paign. Five steamboats, he advised, were being sent under
naval personnel for Call’s use.
Call planned to assemble all available regulars, marines,
seamen, and militia to attack the Indian homeland in the
Withlacoochee River area. His program called for the setting
up of a supply depot on the Withlacoochee by moving in
from the Gulf. This would provide an advance base for land
forces. He would also concentrate supplies at Micanopy and
at Tampa Bay. Mounted troops would advance from Tampa
Bay and Micanopy while infantry would be landed at the
Withlacoochee base. These troops would converge upon Indian
settlements in the Withlacoochee valley. Call also sent an
immediate request to Commodore Alexander J. Dallas at Pen-
sacola to blockade the coast for the prevention of all com-
munication between the Indians and Spanish fishermen, whom
he feared were supplying the Indians.
In organizing his forces, Call ran into immediate difficulties.
The regulars resented being placed under the command of a
civilian and remembered bitterly the inactivity of Call’s volun-
teers at the first battle of the Withlacoochee. The naval forces
cooperating with him resented being placed under the orders
of a civilian who had once been in the army. The Florida
militia were restless because of their uncertain pay. The regu-
lars were badly in need of officers and Call found that among
eleven artillery companies there were only six officers; eight
infantry companies had no officers at all; and there were no
ordnance, subsistence, or quartermaster officers in the entire
Territory. 4 To these difficulties was added the fact that Call
4. The Adjutant-General informed Call that he had often told the Sec-
retary of War about the officer shortage, but that that official had
insisted that internal improvements demanded attention and “he will
not consent that the absent officers so employed shall be withdrawn
and ordered to join their companies.” The Adjutant-General saw no
early remedy.
7
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had never before had complete charge of a major campaign.
Despite these hindrances, Call’s plan of operations won the
approval of prominent military men, including President Jack-
son and General Jesup.
In putting his operations into effect, Call asked Commodore
Dallas for his cooperation and requested that he establish a
blockade to cut off foreign aid to the Seminoles. Commodore
Dallas, aboard the U.S. Frigate Constellation in Pensacola
Bay, replied that he had used all measures to prevent con-
tact between the Spanish and the Indians, and observed, “I
flatter myself nothing has been neglected or left undone that
could in any way give effect to the military force in Florida.
This explanation of what has been done is given, not that I
feel in the least called upon to make it, but out of courtesy
to your station as Governor of Florida, and the high con-
sideration I entertain of you as a gentleman.” Dallas assured
Call that he should be happy to cooperate with him by com-
plying with any of his suggestions which did not interfere
with more important duties, but added, “I beg that your sug-
gestions may have less the character of an order than those
heretofore received.”
  Call was indignant at the coolness shown by the Navy and
informed Cass that the measures of Dallas had been totally
ineffective in suppressing contraband trade. The Indians, he
asserted, continued to kidnap Negroes and to exchange them
with the Spaniards for supplies. The only remedy Call could
suggest was for Cass to have several revenue cutters placed
directly under his command for the blockade activities. Cass,
however, felt that this move would be improper in that it
would imply lack of confidence in the Navy. That Call felt
such lack of confidence is obvious, but Cass was content to
minimize the difficulties in Florida. He advised Call to cor-
respond “frankly” with Dallas on naval matters and said,
8
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“Should you find it indispensable that some vessel be under
your immediate direction, would it not be better to employ
one of the steamboats already engaged, or to procure another
for the purpose?”
Governor Call made it a point to keep General Jesup, who
was commander of the Army of the South, informed as to
his plans. In one letter after his exchanges with Dallas and
Cass he told Jesup that Dallas had “imperfectly complied” with
his request for cooperation. He further related to Jesup:
I have since addressed the Secretary of War on the
subject, who, instead of acting with the promptness and
energy which the importance of the case required, refers
me back again to Commodore Dallas, and suggests that
I may employ one of the crazy steamboats of the Gov-
ernment on this service, while the whole West India
squadron is lying at anchor in the bay of Pensacola.
This information was forwarded to the War Department
by Jesup, but was not answered by Lewis Cass who resigned
as of October 6, 1836. The acting Secretary of War, C. A.
Harris, replied on October 7 reproving Call for his censure
of the War Department. Harris deemed it “highly indecorous,
improper, and unjust.” He reminded Call that the Department
had no control over naval operations and asserted that the
Navy Department had not been laggard: “Full and positive
instructions have been repeatedly given to Commodore Dallas
. . . to cooperate with you.” Harris also was irked at Call’s
criticism of the “crazy steamboats.” “This department,” he
wrote, “certainly had no expectation that you would select a
‘crazy’ one . . . as you had already been invested with full
public power to buy or charter whatever vessels might be
necessary for your marine operations.” Harris, apparently an-
noyed by Call’s habit of writing to the president, closed with,
“This letter has been seen and approved by the President.”
9
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The interim Secretary of War, B. F. Butler, later got Call’s
explanation for his low regard for the steamboats. Call wrote
that he called them crazy “. . . on the report of the officers
who commanded them, and who represented them as being
dangerous in running from one port to another, along the
coast, even in most favorable weather. He [Harris] says that
he did not expect me to send a crazy one. When all were
crazy, how could I do otherwise?” Scornfully Call declared that
the War Department would have had him charter or build
boats while the whole West India squadron idled in Pensa-
cola Bay.
IV
Meanwhile General Thomas Jesup, who was to assume the
command upon arrival in Florida, ended his service against
the Creeks and arrived with his forces in West Florida about
September 25. Call immediately tendered the command of
the war to Jesup, but the general declined, insisting that
Call carry out the operations which he had planned. Call
communicated this news to Washington and reported that
Jesup had voluntarily placed himself and his forces under his
command.
Call’s first major setback came when the regulars aban-
doned Micanopy which he had planned to use as a supply
base. The supplies which were destined for Micanopy he
then directed to Volusia. In the west, he set up a supply
depot at Suwanee Old Town and concentrated supplies at
St. Marks for transport to the Withlacoochee. Supplies from
New Orleans and St. Marks were then moved to the mouth
of the Suwanee River from which place the expedition to
the Withlacoochee River was to depart. Of the five “crazy”
steamboats, two were laid up for repairs, two were unsuited
for operations on the Withlacoochee, and the other had been
ordered back to Pensacola by Commodore Dallas. Call coun-
10
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termanded this order and sent instead the two vessels unsuited
for his needs. Call reported that these two never returned
and that he had no idea what became of them. General Leigh
Read was ordered to take the one good steamboat, two barges,
and a chartered vessel and establish a depot fifteen miles up
the Withlacoochee River.
The major movement of troops overland from Middle Florida
was then begun. On October 8 the troops were strengthened
and refreshed at Fort Drane and marched southward to the
Withlacoochee. The day of October 13 was spent in unsuc-
cessful attempts to cross the river in the face of Indian re-
sistance. With only about a day’s rations left on the fourteenth,
Call decided to seek out the depot which Leigh Read had
been order to set up. However, due to a series of comic opera
mishaps, Read had not yet reached the point upon the river
where the supply center was to be located.
Read had left the mouth of the Suwanee River with one
government steamboat, the barges, and the chartered vessel
according to plan. However, in proceeding up the Withla-
coochee, the government steamboat had run aground strad-
dling the narrow channel, and at low tide promptly broke in
two. That the vessel ran aground, Call blamed upon the Navy.
He declared that officers used to ocean navigation had been
placed in charge of directing this vessel in a narrow unfamiliar
stream. Read’s second attempt to plant the depot was made
on October 22 and succeeded, but Call’s forces had by that
time fallen back on Fort Drane and Black Creek.
It was this initial reverse, due to Read’s failure to establish
his base, which led to Call’s removal. Through some mishap
Call’s reports, which do not indicate that Call considered the
withdrawal anything more than a temporary delay, did not
reach Washington. Reports from other sources, together with
the accurate news that Call was not well, so alarmed the
11
Doherty: Richard K. Call vs. the Federal Government on the Seminole War
Published by STARS, 1952
174 FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
administration that orders were forwarded for General Jesup
to take immediate command.
President Jackson reported to Congress that “. . . early
measures were taken for placing at the disposal of Governor
Call, who as commander in chief of the Territorial Militia
had been temporarily invested with the command, an ample
force for the purpose of resuming offensive operations in the
most efficient manner so soon as the season should permit.”
He informed the Congress that Call’s moves had had results
which “excited much surprise and disappointment. A full ex-
planation has been required of the causes which led to the
failure of that movement, but has not yet been received.”
Meanwhile, fearing that Call was not in condition equal to
the crisis, he had given Jesup the command. 5
As we have noted, news of his removal did not reach Call
until after he had reorganized his campaign, repulsed the
Indians in three engagements, and retired to Volusia. In his
letter of removal, Secretary Butler informed Call that no defi-
nite judgement against him had been formed but that he had
been “instructed by the President to express to you his disap-
pointment and surprise that you should have commenced the
execution of a campaign of so much importance, and so long
meditated, without first taking effectual measures to secure
all needful supplies from the various depots, which, for several
months, have been subject to your orders; and . . . after ap-
proaching with so large a force within so short a distance
of the enemy . . . you should have retired without a more
serious attempt to cross the river and to drive him from his
position. This disappointment and regret are greatly increased
by the considerations that these retrograde movements will
probably expose the frontiers to new invasions by marauding
parties, and encourage the Indians in their resistance, thereby
5. James D. Richardson (ed.), Messages and Papers of the Presidents,
20 volumes (Washington, 1896-1927), III, 253.
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increasing . . . the severity of the measures which will now
be required to subdue them.”
On December 2, 1836, Call replied to Butler in a lengthy,
bitter letter which he said was delayed by ill health. He
scoffed at Butler’s words that no judgement had been formed
of him by pointing out that the president had visited upon
him the highest disgrace possible in removing him from
command. Should I be able to show injustice, he asked, can
the injury be repaired? Call then retraced the entire campaign
under his command, citing his preparations, his difficulties,
and the accidents involved. He defended his original with-
drawal from the Withlacoochee on October 13 and declared
that the crossing “could not have been accomplished by Gen-
eral Jackson himself.” The successful November crossing had
cost four lives by drowning.
Butler was unsympathetic with Call’s position and viewed
his report as excited and full of rash statements. He wrote,
“. . . you indulge in many remarks not at all necessary to
the explanation of your conduct, or the defense of your char-
acter.” Call was in error, Butler said, in assuming that his
removal was punishment for misconduct. He reminded the
governor that he had been only temporarily put in command
from the beginning and that information at hand in Wash-
ington had caused the decision that Jesup must assume the
command for which he had been intended in Florida. The
demand for an explanation Butler thought was well warranted
by conditions in the Territory. He reminded Call that the
fact that what occurred should excite and surprise the presi-
dent, “no one better knows than yourself.”
The Secretary of War told Call that after due deliberation
he had been exonerated of any responsibility for the failure
of General Read to establish his supply depot, but he as-
serted that the exoneration was “the fullest measure of justice
13
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to which you are entitled.” In the opinion of the War Depart-
ment, Call was still at fault for moving his troops without
definite knowledge that the indispensable depot had been
established. Butler pointed out that from the outset the
chances had been great that Read would fail, however, he
conceded that the president cheerfully allowed that Call’s error
lay in a patriotic desire to win the war. “More than this . . .
it seems to us impossible, consistently with justice, to concede.”
The administration held that the basic cause of the fiasco
was still Call’s negligence in not insuring a steady flow of
supplies to maintain a vigorous offensive.
Call’s exchanges with Butler continued until the end of
Butler’s term of office in March, 1837. In February, Call struck
back at Butler’s censure, holding that the Secretary of War
was in no position to judge his moves from a vantage point
1000 miles away. “You may,” Call wrote, “by intuition, possess
that knowledge of the profession of arms which others have
acquired by years of hardy service in the field . . .” He ad-
mitted that his letter of reply to his dismissal was written under
excitement and deplored any injustice he may have done to
the president, for whom he professed the deepest respect. In
further defense of his reputation, the governor related that
when he took command the Indians had been conquerors and
he had relieved the frontier from invasion; he had rebuilt Fort
Drane; he had established the Withlacoochee depot; he had
in thirty-four days made all necessary preparations for a
vigorous campaign; and he had won three victories after being
relieved.
With a note of relief, Butler directed his last letter to Call
on March 13 saying, “I shall leave the department this day.
. . . I find it impossible to reply, in detail, to the various sug-
gestions, arguments, and complaints presented by you. Nor
do I deem it at all necessary that I should do so.” Call de-
14
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livered up his command to Jesup and returned to Tallahassee,
a proud man deeply wounded.
V
Call remained Governor of Florida, and in 1839 was re-
appointed by President Martin Van Buren. Yet his criticisms
of the government’s war policies continued, much to the dis-
gust of Joel R. Poinsett who was Secretary of War in the
Van Buren administration. In Florida, Call’s pro-Whig political
activity caused local Democrats to petition the administration
constantly for his removal. Finally, in December, 1839, Van
Buren replaced Call with a staunch Democrat, Robert Ray-
 mond Reid. Probably both Call’s Whiggish political activity
and his criticism of war policy were the causes for his re-
moval, but the latter was the official reason. According to
Poinsett, “. . . no disgrace was attached to his removal. He
thought proper to assume an attitude opposed to this depart-
ment, and his continuance in office was therefore deemed
incompatible with the interests of the public service.”
When Jackson relieved Call of his military command the
cordial friendship between the two men came to an end,
though Call continued to respect the military prowess of the
old general. Increasingly Call had been drifting away from
the president in politics. His growing property interests in-
clined his political views more and more toward the policies
of the Whig party and in 1840 Call openly avowed his sup-
port of the Whigs and his opposition to the Democrats. Jack-
son was provoked at the apostacy of his old protege and as-
sumed that he must be in debt or broke, “for we find all who
are broke join the opposition and are in favor of Banks,
wishing to pay their debts by a depreciated paper.“ 6
6. Andrew Jackson to F. P. Blair, Sept. 26, 1940, John Spencer Bassett,
Correspondence of Andrew Jackson, 7 volumes (Washington, 1926),
VI, 78.
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In Call’s mind, both of his removals had been injustices
to him. Van Buren removed him, as he saw it, only because
he had been critical of the “weakness and imbecility” of Poin-
sett in prosecuting the war. However, there seems to be more
real grounds for a plea of injustice in the case of the earlier
removal from military command. The original appointment of
Call as commander of the Seminole War seems illogical, even
fantastic, in light of all the circumstances, unless it was in-
tended as a purely interim appointment during which time
no extensive military activity was to be undertaken. Call was
notoriously unpopular with the regulars and had no reputa-
tion for successful field command of any element larger than
a battalion. He had held no regular army rank higher than
captain, and that fourteen years earlier, and he had given up
his post as militia general when he became governor.
These are marks against the Jackson administration, how-
ever, not against Call. The worst that can be said of Call is
that he was an overly ambitious man who sought a post
which another might have filled to better advantage. In Call’s
favor is the vigor with which he pursued his frustrating task
in the face of War Department complacency, militia rebel-
liousness, Navy hostility, and Army suspicion. He was awake
to the seriousness of the Indian troubles while the War De-
partment was still trying to believe that only a minor dis-
turbance threatened. His plans for the attack upon the Indian
home territory were admirably conceived, even if not well
carried out. Of his activities, General Jesup told Secretary of
War Butler, “As an act of justice to Governor Call, I take the
occasion to remark that no man could, under the circum-
stances in which he has been placed, have accomplished more
than he has done. His plan of campaign was admirable.”
Studying the documents from the vantage point of the
present day, Jackson’s action in relieving Call appears to have
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been hasty and not based upon sufficient information. How-
ever, in that day of poor and slow communication, his removal
probably was the only safe step which could be taken in
Washington. Call was known to have been ill through the
entire campaign. Jesup was known to be on the scene, and
had previous orders to assume command - orders he had de-
clined to carry out until Call should complete his campaign.
If the reports which Washington had received of a disastrous
withdrawal were true, then Call’s campaign must have been
wrecked. In the absence of any word from Call the adminis-
tration must assume that he was incapacitated by illness, or
that he might even be dead. At any rate, with the news avail-
able of events in Florida the federal government took the
steps which seemed to it to be those best calculated to protect
the public interest.
Had telegraphic communications been available, Richard
Keith Call might have been the military hero of the Seminole
War. The story which has been related, however, shows that
he was allowed to command the war only about four months
and in this period he was unable to launch any decisive action
against the Indians.
Whatever his shortcomings may have been, Call must be
credited with having had a clearer view of the overall picture
of the war than did the War Department. The department,
with President Jackson’s approval, planned to suspend the war
each summer in the mistaken belief that a summer campaign
could not be endured by the troops. Call correctly foresaw
that such a policy would allow the Indians to harvest their
crops and prepare to sustain another winter campaign. Rather
than concentrate the troops in forts through the summer, Call
would maintain a mobile striking force to lay waste the Indian
fields and villages and draw back the marauding warriors to
defend their own homes. He realized that no stationary defense
line could contain the Indians, who were masters of infiltra-
17
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tion tactics. Call’s plan would thus carry the war to the Indian
territory and provide the best defense against Indian attack
upon rich Middle Florida. The War Department, with hesita-
tion, eventually deferred to Call’s experience and knowledge.
It is to be regretted that his plans were not earlier executed with
firmness, efficiency, and the full cooperation of all responsible
authorities.
(The author in his research for a biography of Richard Keith Call is
using all known collected material, but for certain periods and episodes
the amount available pertaining to Call and his associates in Florida is
limited. Should any reader possess or know of Call letters, letters referring
to Call, or other unpublished or scarce material which might touch upon
this subject, the QUARTERLY as well as Mr. Doherty would be grateful to
be told of such.)
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